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“And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?”
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Scott Spoonauer of LaptopMag seems to be spending quite a bit of time trying to insinuate that Linux has missed its opportunity for widespread adoption. For example:
Others are picking up on the meme, and refuting it. See Linux Watch and Linux Solutions. Let’s do the same, shall we?
As I have already pointed out, Microsoft’s dual actions in extending the end-of-life for Windows XP and in offering pennies-on-the-dollar licensing for ULCPCs is a de facto concession of the threat of Linux. These actions are a stop-gap gambit to avoid loss of market share, and are neither sustainable nor viable, long-term.
OEM licensing (presumably, Windows and Office) accounts for 95% of Microsoft’s revenues. Thus, Microsoft finds itself in a no-win situation in the ULCPC market: either concede the market to Linux, and thus generate no revenue due to no OEM licensing, or else give away OEM licenses (essentially for free) and thus generate no revenue from the OEM licenses they do procure.
The Linux business model is entirely different. With a few rare exceptions (SLED, Xandros, etc.), Linux distributions do not make money by selling OEM or end-user licenses for use of their OS; rather, the Linux business model is to give away the software and then make money by selling support contracts.
So, extrapolating the current environment several years: Microsoft continues to generate no revenues by giving away OEM licenses and offering support for an otherwise end-of-life operating system, while the Linux revenue stream is entirely unaffected. Linux is positioned to win any protracted desktop market share battle of attrition.
The second fatal flaw in Spoonauer’s argument is the inherent assumption that US market share will continue to dictate the adoption rate for desktop Linux. While this assumption may hold true today, it is quickly being invalidated.
While Microsoft has entrenched itself in the various sales channels in the US (retail outlets, vendor online sales, etc.), it is quickly losing its grip outside of the US, due to increasing open source (and, in some cases, anti-Microsoft) trends, especially in Europe and Asia - not to mention the growing computer-user market in third-world countries.
Government agencies, educational institutions, and others are moving desktop installations wholesale from Windows to Linux, by the thousands and tens of thousands. Each one of these desktop Linux installations directly impacts Microsoft’s bottom line.
In short, the jury may still be out regarding the ability of Linux eventually to realize its full potential - and market share - but if Windows remains the only viable threat to Linux desktop market share, Then the Linux window of opportunity will remain open in perpetuity. Microsoft’s business model will ensure it.